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What Is An Antique? 
 
Abstract 
Antiques are undoubtedly objects worthy of aesthetic appreciation, but do they have a 
distinctive aesthetic value in virtue of being antiques? In this paper we give an account of 
what it is to be an antique that gives the thesis that they do have a distinctive aesthetic 
value a chance of being true, and suggests what that distinctive value consists in. After 
introducing our topic in section I, in section II we develop and defend the Adjectival 
Thesis: the thesis that the concept of being an antique is an adjectival concept. This 
provides us with the means to formulate our definition, which we do in section III. In 
section IV we further explicate and defend our definition. In section V we conclude by 
briefly saying where we think our definition could be improved, by making a few 
comments about the aesthetics of antiques, and by stating an interesting consequence of 
our definition: that it is not analytic that antiques are old. 
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BENJAMIN L. CURTIS 
DARRIN BAINES 
 
What Is An Antique? 
 
I. Introduction 
Antiques are undoubtedly objects worthy of aesthetic appreciation, but do they 
have a distinctive aesthetic value in virtue of being antiques? Our aim in this paper 
is not to answer this question directly, but rather to supply some necessary 
groundwork required for answering it. We offer an analysis of what it is to be an 
antique that gives the thesis that they do have a distinctive aesthetic value a 
chance of being true, and suggests what that distinctive value consists in. 
Given that typical antiques are usually entirely non-representational and 
were originally made to serve a specific non-aesthetic function (e.g. antique chairs 
were made to be sat on), it is plausible that the aesthetic value of a typical antique 
lies partly in how well its formal properties (namely, those aesthetically relevant 
properties that are, in some sense, immediately graspable in experience) are 
balanced with those properties that allow it to fulfil its intended function. But 
although any definition of an antique must allow that its formal properties are 
aesthetically important, this cannot be the whole story, for this would not 
distinguish antiques from newly made items. 
Danto’s famous argument against formalism about the aesthetic value of 
art (see, e.g. Danto 1981, 94–95; Danto 1986, 30–31) has an analogue in the case 
of antiques. Consider a genuine antique chair (say, a Hepplewhite) and a newly 
made atom-for-atom duplicate produced by a high-tech copying device. Just as an 
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original piece of art work possesses significantly more value than any copy, it 
seems the genuine Hepplewhite possesses significantly more value than its copy 
too.i This clearly generalises and so, it seems, a major part of an antique object’s 
aesthetic value derives from its possession of certain extrinsic non-formal 
properties.ii But which properties are relevant here? Anti-formalists about the 
value of art most often appeal to certain extrinsic historical properties, such as the 
context in which the art object was made, its relation to the art world, and its 
method of production. Properties like these are no doubt important in the case of 
antiques too, but this seems to miss something important. If antiques have a 
distinctive aesthetic value, it seems it is one that they gain over time. Although 
they have the extrinsic properties of being made in a particular context and using 
a particular method of production from the moment they come into existence, it is 
only later that they gain their full aesthetic standing by becoming antiques. In a 
way that it is not so in the case of art-objects having a certain age itself seems, at 
least prima facie, to be an aesthetically important property in the case of antiques. 
Correspondingly, it seems that the aesthetic appreciation of an antique is 
distinctive in that it involves, in some sense, an appreciation of this very 
property.iii 
Given the importance that antiques seem to have in aesthetics, it is 
surprising that they have received very little attention in the philosophical 
literature. So far as we have been able to ascertain, there is only a single journal 
article, and a single book, on the Philosophy of Antiques. Both are by Leon 
Rosenstein (Rosenstein 1987, 2009), the latter is a fleshed-out version of the 
former, and neither have received much in the way of critical attention.  This paper 
is, in part, an attempt to remedy this situation. As mentioned, however, our 
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primary purpose is not to directly answer questions about the aesthetic value of 
antiques, but rather to supply some necessary groundwork required for 
answering them. Specifically, we give a definition that can serve as a basis upon 
which to answer questions about their aesthetic value. Nonetheless, in giving our 
definition, we also have our eye on the aesthetic value of antiques. Firstly, the 
definition that we will give allows that an antique’s formal properties are 
aesthetically important. Secondly, and more importantly, the definition that we 
will give suggests that having a certain age cannot, in fact, be the property that 
grounds an antique’s distinctive aesthetic value. Rather, it must be the property of 
being rooted in the past that does so (what this means will be explained more fully 
in due course). 
In section II we develop and defend the Adjectival Thesis. This is the thesis 
that the concept of being an antique is an adjectival concept. This provides us with 
the means to formulate our definition, which we do in section III. In section IV we 
further explicate and defend our definition. In section V we conclude by briefly 
saying where we think our definition could be improved, by making a few 
comments about the aesthetics of antiques, and by stating an interesting 
consequence of our definition: that it is not analytic that antiques are old. 
 
 
II. The Adjectival Thesis 
What kind of concept is the concept of being an antique? Is it a sortal concept? That 
is, does the concept of being an antique supply one with synchronic and diachronic 
identity-conditions?iv In fact, we think it is not. Instead we defend the thesis that 
the concept of being an antique is, like the concept of being red, an adjectival 
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concept. According to this thesis, to describe an object as being an antique is not 
to say that it is an object of some special kind K. Rather, it is to say of an object of 
some kind K that it possesses some further property. If something is red, it must 
be a red thing of some kind K (where ‘K’ stands for a term that expresses some 
genuine sortal concept, e.g. ‘table’, ‘chair’, ‘statue’, etc.). Similarly, if the Adjectival 
Thesis is true then, if something is an antique, it must be an antique thing of some 
kind K.  If this thesis is true then the concept of being an antique does not by itself 
supply either synchronic or diachronic identity-conditions. Rather, these are 
supplied in particular cases by an associated sortal concept. In other words, all 
antiques are antiques of a particular kind K, and each inherits its identity 
conditions from the kind K of antique thing it is. So, for example, antique tables 
have the identity-conditions associated with tables, whilst antique clocks have the 
identity-conditions associated with clocks. So, as tables and clocks have distinct 
(synchronic and diachronic) identity-conditions, antique tables have different 
identity-conditions from antique clocks. There simply is nothing general (that is, 
non-disjunctive) that can be said about the identity-conditions of antiques. 
We think that the Adjectival Thesis should be one’s default position, and 
we suppose it will strike many as obviously true. But what can be said in its 
defence? It fits well with how we talk about antiques. We say that tables and chairs 
and vases and figurines (and so on) become antiques. This suggests we think of 
such items as gaining the property of being an antique as they become old. But if 
the concept is a sortal concept this cannot be maintained. Instead one has to hold 
that, when we say (for example) that a table becomes an antique at some time t, 
what we really mean is that a distinct object that materially coincides with the 
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table has come into existence at t, and that this new object is an antique.v Let us 
spell this out in a little more detail. 
We cannot think of any plausible examples in which an antique object 
exists but fails to materially coincide with an object of some uncontroversial sortal 
kind K (that is, all antiques coincide with either tables, or chairs, or clocks, or 
figurines, and so on). So we assert that: for all times t, and all antiques x, if x exists 
at t, then some object y of a (non-antique) sortal kind K exists at t and x materially 
coincides with y at t. According to the Adjectival Thesis antiques are not objects of 
their own kind, and they inherit their identity-conditions from the Ks they 
materially coincide with. This entails that necessarily, every antique object x is 
identical with (that is, is one and the same thing as) the object y of kind K that it 
coincides with at t. (So it entails that the antique object x is also of kind K.) But if 
one denies the Adjectival Thesis one will maintain that antiques are objects of 
their own kind, so associated with distinct identity-conditions from the Ks they 
coincide with, and so could come into existence at different times from the Ks they 
coincide with. But the only plausible time at which an antique could be said to 
come into existence, on this view, is when we would ordinarily say that a K has 
‘become’ an antique – that is, at some time after the K has come into existence. So, 
if one rejects the Adjectival Thesis, Ks can and do exist before the antiques that 
materially coincide with them exist. And so antiques and the Ks they materially 
coincide with must be non-identical. 
It is implausible that antiques are non-identical with the Ks they coincide 
with. As already mentioned, it fails to fit our talk of Ks becoming antiques. But it 
also fails to fit our ordinary beliefs. No-one believes when they are buying an 
antique chair, for example, that they are buying both an antique and a chair. And 
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more substantially still, our linguistic behaviour belies the fact that we are heavily 
inclined to think of antiques as being identical with the Ks they coincide with. 
Suppose there is a Georgian table in front of us, and suppose we ask “When did 
this antique come into existence?” Demonstratives take wide scope, so we here ask 
de re of the object in front of us (that is an antique) when it came into existence.vi 
How would you respond? We think you would be most inclined to respond by 
giving the date on which the table was made (that is, somewhere between 1714 
and 1837). But at that time the table was not an antique, and so if one denies the 
Adjectival Thesis, no antique existed. So referring using the demonstrative ‘this 
antique’ in situations like this, one denotes an object that is a table and not some 
non-identical shorter-lived materially coincident object that is an antique. 
Given its plausibility, why would anyone wish to deny the Adjectival 
Thesis? Because there are cases that seem to be inconsistent with it. We said we 
cannot think of any plausible examples in which an antique object fails to coincide 
with an object of some uncontroversial sortal kind K. But we can think of many 
cases in which, plausibly, one and the same antique coincides with an object of 
kind K at one time, and with a distinct object of kind K’ at another. From the 
outside, the antique trade may seem reputable and an antique classed as such may 
be assumed to be genuine. Like the art market, however, the market for antiques 
is full of spurious pieces, from pieces misrepresented in terms of their age to 
complete fakes, from elaborations added to lesser pieces to make them more 
valuable to conversion of existing pieces in terms of size and shape. (Hayward, 
1970; Cescinsky, 1967; Symonds, 1927) The antique market is awash with 
“antiques” that have been converted from one piece of furniture into another. An 
example comes from a book by the cabinet-maker, W Crawley (Crawley 1971), 
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who outlines ways of ascertaining whether a piece of antique furniture is genuine. 
Working as an apprentice, Crawley reports that in 1939, he had a fair amount of 
satin wood, mostly from a Victorian wardrobe. He spent several months working 
in his spare time, making a “very nice” semi-circular commode, a copy of a popular 
eighteenth-century design. Crawley admits that the piece had faults. For instance, 
the door lock was from the Victorian wardrobe rather than sourced from an 
eighteenth-century original. On the second time of trying, Crawley reports that he 
managed to sell his new piece at a “knocked-down” price of £8.75. Throughout his 
career, Crawley occasionally saw his piece being sold as a genuine antique by 
different dealers in London’s West End, at a price much higher than the original 
price. 
Now, consider a case of a commode that was converted in, say, 2010, from 
a Victorian wardobe by a modern-day cabinet maker in the same way that Crawley 
made the conversion in 1939. In this case there was certainly an antique present 
prior to the 2010 conversion that coincided with the original Victorian wardrobe. 
And had that wardrobe not been converted into a commode, there would certainly 
be an antique present now that materially coincides with it too. But is there an 
antique present now, given that the wardrobe was converted into a commode? 
The concept of being a wardrobe is a sortal concept (let us label it ‘W’). So 
in the Victorian era an object o1 of kind W came into existence. And in 2010 o1 
had some parts removed and was modified in various ways, and what resulted 
was undeniably a commode. The concept of being a commode is also a sortal 
concept (let us label it ‘C’). So in 2010 an object o2 of kind C came into existence. 
So, the situation is this: 
1. In the Victorian era an object o1 of kind W came into existence. 
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o1 underwent changes in 2010 which resulted in: 
2. In 2010 an object o2 of kind C came into existence. 
If we further suppose, as everyone does, that: 
3. No object of a kind K can survive any change (or set of changes) that results in 
it becoming an object of a distinct kind K’.  
Then we must conclude that the original wardrobe o1 does not survive. It goes out 
of existence in 2010 due to changes made to it, and as a result a new object o2, a 
commode, comes into existence. So, we must conclude: 
C. o1 (the wardrobe) is non-identical with o2 (the commode). 
If we maintain the Adjectival Thesis we maintain that the antique that 
materially coincides with o1 prior to 2010 just is that wardrobe. That is, it is 
identical with o1. So when the wardrobe goes out of existence in 2010, so does the 
antique. So, if we maintain the Adjectival Thesis it is incorrect to describe o2 as a 
Victorian commode, and incorrect to describe it as an antique. However, if one 
denies the Adjectival Thesis one can maintain that the description is correct. One 
can maintain that antiques are kinds of things that come into existence when 
another object (in this case a wardrobe) reaches a certain age, and that they are 
kinds of things that can survive (unlike wardrobes) radical material changes. So in 
this case, for example, one would maintain that there is a further thing o3 of a 
distinct kind (that is, of the kind antique) that coincides with o1 before 2010 and 
coincides with o2 afterwards. 
  We have no knock-down argument against anyone who denies the 
Adjectival Thesis for the above reason. But we think that saving a particular 
description of cases such as the one above is a poor reason to reject the Adjectival 
Thesis given the support the thesis gains elsewhere (namely, from our linguistic 
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usage and our ordinary beliefs). We think the correct conclusion to draw about 
cases like the one above is that auction houses sometimes mis-describe items of 
furniture, such as our commode, as being antiques, when, strictly speaking, they 
are not. 
So we take the Adjectival Thesis to be true. This means that in specifying 
what an antique is we are not looking to give the identity-conditions for antiques 
(for there are none to give). Rather, we are looking to specify what conditions an 
object of a kind K must meet if it is to be counted as an antique. Now, we take it as 
being obvious that not any kind of thing K can be an antique. Natural kinds, for 
example, cannot be antiques. No matter how long a parrot lives, for example, it will 
never become an antique. So what kinds of things can become antiques? In fact, 
we’re not sure how to answer this question precisely, but for our purposes we can 
make do with the following rough-and-ready answer: only man-made items – 
artefactual kinds – can become antiques; tables, chairs, vases, brooches, figurines, 
etc. So, in giving an account of what an antique is we are looking to fill out the 
right-hand side of the following schema: 
 
ANT: An object x of an artefactual kind K is an antique K iff… 
 
III. Filling Out the ANT-Schema 
In this section we argue that we should fill out the right-hand side of the ANT-
schema with just two conditions that relate to technical excellence and age.vii 
 
Technical excellence: Leon Rosenstein suggests that technical perfection is a 
necessary condition for being an antique. But what is technical perfection? 
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Technical perfection involves many elements. On the one hand, it concerns 
the question of how (by what processes) the material medium has been 
formed (designed) and whether or not the choice of materials in a given 
instance and the manner of conforming them to the design best embody 
the idea of the work. We also ask, conversely, does the idea best bring out 
the characteristics of the material? This aspect often is referred to as “truth 
to materials,” which sometimes means allowing the materials the upper 
hand, giving them leeway to do what they most naturally tend to do (as 
when wood is left to show its grain and to dictate the shape and 
proportions of a table surface), but sometimes can mean allowing the idea 
and design to have the upper hand, forcing the materials to do that which 
by their nature they are disinclined to do (as when iron and glass are used 
in fashions contrary to their nature – in Art Nouveau constructions, for 
example)… Technical perfection is the cause of the experience that can only 
be captured by imaging that the work in presenting itself to us is saying, 
“Voila!” 
 
We agree (almost) entirely. However, it is unclear whether Rosenstein believes, as 
the term ‘perfection’ implies, that those objects that exemplify technical perfection 
could not have been improved upon. At any rate, we do not endorse this view. 
There are many clear examples of antiques that are not technically perfect. So we 
relax the requirement by allowing that objects exemplifying (mere!) technical 
excellence, rather than technical perfection, can be antiques. And we wish to make 
one minor (and obvious) addition: technical excellence is also relative to kinds. 
(Technical excellence in tables is one thing, technical excellence in cameo 
brooches another.) But, we agree that this condition is indeed a necessary 
condition. That is, only well-designed Ks that are well-made from good materials 
can be antique Ks. To this we add that being well-designed and well-made from 
good materials relates to how well a K’s formal properties are balanced with those 
properties that allow it to fulfil its intended function as a K, and thus no doubt 
plays a large role in the aesthetic value than an antique K has. It is probably not 
possible to precisely capture the distinction, even for a particular kind K, between 
those things that exemplify technical excellence and those that don’t (there is 
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undoubtedly a vague boundary between the two). But we hope the reader 
recognises that the distinction exists and is able to recognise clear examples from 
both categories. (A Chippendale desk is a clear example of a desk that exemplifies 
technical excellence, whereas a modern, mass produced desk is a clear example of 
a desk that does not.) 
 
Age: The definition of an antique that is used in (most) legal contexts states that in 
order to be an antique an object must be over one-hundred years old. But this is 
an arbitrary stipulation originally made for pragmatic reasons to do with 
taxation.viii In the trade and amongst connoisseurs this crude condition is never 
adhered to, and so it does not track any real “joint” in the concept of being an 
antique.  Indeed there are clear examples of objects universally considered (in the 
trade) to be antiques that are far fewer than one-hundred years old. Rosenstein 
gives the example of Art Deco bracelets made by Cartier in the 1920s. To this we 
add that certain items of Edwardian furniture made between 1900 and 1910 have 
been considered antiques now for many years. So how are we to understand the 
age criterion? Rosenstein goes on to say: 
Age is better understood as “agedness”. This historical characteristic 
means that it clearly is made in a style that is no longer current and that it 
clearly shows material signs of aging… but especially that it speaks for its 
age. That is, it is sufficiently exemplary of its past era to evoke for us an 
image of that world now gone. (Rosenstein, 2009, p175) 
 
There is some truth in this; it is a necessary condition of being an antique that an 
object was made in a style that is exemplary of the era in which the object was 
made. (Note also that, in agreement with Rosenstein, we consider an object’s 
method of production to be part of its style – but often, for clarity, we will speak of 
this as a separate condition.) But the suggestion that the style in which it was made 
12 
 
must no longer be current should be rejected. The reason is simple. Style revivals 
are common-place (including revivals of methods of production), and we should 
not rule out an object as being an antique on the basis that the style in which it 
was made has now become fashionable again. So, the condition should be stated 
in the following way: an object is an antique only if it was made in a style (and 
using a method of production) that is exemplary of the era in which the object was 
made, and that has subsequently become obsolete.ix 
More substantially, that an antique must show material signs of age should 
be rejected. Certainly showing signs of age can sometimes add value to an antique 
(e.g. a nice patina on an oak desk), and that an object shows material signs of age 
can give us evidence that the object really was made in a past era. But it can hardly 
be considered a necessary condition of being an antique that it shows its age. It is 
possible to artificially bring the ageing process of an artefact virtually to a halt by, 
for example, placing it in a vacuum. But any object that counts as being an antique 
would still count as being an antique even had it been placed in a vacuum on the 
day it was made and had remained there untouched ever since. So showing 
material signs of age cannot be a necessary condition of being an antique. 
 The suggestion that we include as a necessary condition that an antique has 
the capacity to evoke in us an image of the world now past should also be rejected. 
Rosenstein makes heavy weather of this condition, explaining it more fully under 
the heading of subject. According to Rosenstein, (i.) the past world that an antique 
evokes, and (ii.) the way in which it was constructed from its constituent 
materials, are the “subjects” of an antique.x What Rosenstein seems to have in 
mind is that antiques enable us to access information about the past time at which 
they were made, and about how they were constructed, in some special kind of 
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way. If we allow that, in order to access this information in this way, pre-existing 
knowledge of the past and special training (perhaps special aesthetic training) 
may be required, this is perhaps plausible. Then Rosenstein’s view is that at least 
some antiques have certain properties that allow someone specially attuned to 
them to appreciate how they were made and how they were used in the past. But 
then we may as well state this condition directly in terms of the properties that 
specially trained individuals are attuned to, rather than in terms of those specially 
attuned individuals themselves. 
What, then, are these properties? Rosenstein’s answer is: an object’s style, 
the perceptible signs of its method of production, and its signs of material ageing. 
But we have already said that it is a necessary condition of being an antique that 
an object is made in a style (which includes its method of production) that is 
exemplary of the era in which the object was made. And we have already ruled out 
showing signs of material ageing as being a further necessary condition. If we 
further add that all aspects of an object’s style except its method of production are 
invariably perceptible, we now see that all this condition adds is that in certain 
circumstances an antique’s method of production must be perceptible. But this 
cannot plausibly be considered a necessary condition for being an antique under 
any circumstances. What is important is not whether we can tell if an object was 
made using a method of production that is exemplary of the era in which it was 
made. All that is important is that it was made using such a method.xi 
That an object is made in a (subsequently obsolete) style that is exemplary 
of the era in which the object was made is, then, a necessary condition of being an 
antique, on our view. But what constitutes being made in a particular style? And 
when does a style become obsolete? These are difficult questions, and we do not 
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attempt to give precise answers here. But we do not need to give precise answers 
in order to use the notions of an antique’s style and its method of production. It is 
enough that we can recognise that styles and methods of production exist, are 
rooted in certain times, do change over the years, and do become obsolete. For 
example, the style and methods of production for making furniture used by the 
Elizabethans is different from the style and methods of production used by those 
in the time of George II, which is different from those used by the Edwardians, 
which is different from those used today. And the styles and methods used by the 
Elizabethans were obsolete by the time of George II, whose styles and methods 
were obsolete by the time of the Edwardians, whose styles and methods are now 
obsolete. 
A useful notion in understanding our point here is that of ‘authenticity’. We 
can recognise that only those cabinet-makers who learned their trade in a 
particular era, embedded within the social practices, norms, and working 
conditions of that era, can produce authentic furniture in the style of that era. 
Someone might attempt to produce furniture today in the same style and using the 
same methods of production as, say, the Elizabethans. But they would not have 
learnt those methods in the same way. In particular, they would not have been 
embedded within the social practices, norms, and working conditions of the 
Elizabethan era. As such, our modern-day cabinet-maker would be producing 
furniture by copying the methods and styles of the Elizabethans. The resultant 
furniture, no matter how similar it might be to authentic Elizabethan furniture, 
would not be authentic Elizabethan furniture for this reason. Part of what it 
means, then, to say that a style and method of production for making Ks is 
exemplary of the era in which the Ks were made, is that the style and method of 
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production are rooted in that era, where this is understood to mean that those 
making the Ks learned how to do so in an authentic manner. We say also that Ks 
made in such a way are themselves rooted in that past era.xii 
Our view is that this notion, that styles and methods of production (and so 
the artefacts produced using them) are rooted in the past, is the main notion 
underlying the concept of an antique. In order to be an antique an artefact must 
be rooted in the past. And if an artefact is of sufficient quality (that is, if it 
exemplifies technical excellence), then it is an antique if it is rooted in the past. So 
these two conditions capture what it is for an object of an artefactual kind K to be 
an antique K. 
Our view explains why it takes time for objects to become antiques. Styles 
and methods of production evolve slowly, and so it takes time for any particular 
style and method of production to become obsolete. Moreover, it explains the 
common idea that antiques themselves fall into distinct categories. Antique 
English furniture is usually classified (albeit crudely) in terms of the monarchs on 
the throne at the time the furniture was made. During the 18th Century, for 
example, we have William III furniture (1694-1702), Queen Anne furniture (1702-
1714), early Georgian furniture (1714-1760), and late Georgian furniture (1760-
1811). What these classifications recognise, however crudely, is that the styles and 
methods of production used to make furniture changed significantly from one 
period to the next in England, and so the furniture produced in each period 
warrants being considered as falling into a distinct antique category. 
Of course, that the styles and methods of production of furniture in England 
changed significantly across these periods does not mean that the styles and 
methods of production of other artefactual kinds changed significantly during the 
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same period. And indeed, for some kinds of thing they did not change significantly. 
Porcelain, for example, was not made at all in England until after 1747. Shortly 
after this time a number of competing manufacturers appeared across the country, 
each using distinct styles and methods of production which remained, in each 
case, more-or-less unchanged for the following fifty years or so. But this is also 
recognised in the standard classificatory scheme. English porcelain is not 
classified in terms of the Monarchical system, but simply as 18th Century English 
porcelain. Given our account, this is not surprising. Kinds are often associated with 
their own particular styles and methods of production, and we should not expect 
the styles and methods of production of every kind of thing to change in line with 
every other kind of thing. 
This brings us to another important point that we have so far neglected – 
that of location. Styles and methods of production are not only rooted in times, but 
also in places. Furniture across England was produced in a more-or-less uniform 
manner at any given time in the 18th Century, so we generally have no need to 
categorise antique English furniture in any more place-specific manner, and can 
make do with the Monarchical categorisation. But with English porcelain matters 
are quite different. Despite the fact that the styles and methods of production used 
by each 18th Century porcelain manufacturer did not change significantly during 
this period, they differed significantly across manufacturers. And this too is 
reflected in the standard classificatory scheme. Thus we have 18th Century 
Worcester porcelain, Derby porcelain, Chelsea porcelain, Bow porcelain, Spode 
porcelain, and so on. So, we ought to include reference to location in our definition 
too. 
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So, to sum up, we have argued that the following definition correctly 
captures the necessary and sufficient conditions for being an antique: 
 
ANT*:  An object x of an artefactual kind K is an antique K iff x exemplifies technical 
excellence (for a K) and was made in a style and using a method of production (for 
making Ks) that subsequently became obsolete, but is exemplary of (and so rooted 
in) the era and place in which the K was made. 
 
One might argue that this definition is too broad, and includes certain objects as 
being antiques that are not antiques. Consider, for example, well-made VCR 
players. Such items were first produced in the mid-1970s and became obsolete by 
the mid-2000s. One might object that such items would not generally be 
considered antiques, but claim that our definition entails that they are, and so 
argue that our definition is inadequate.xiii 
 In response to objections of this kind, there are a number of things to be 
said. Firstly, if it is true that our definition does entail that items such as well-made 
VCR players are antiques, this is not necessarily a problem for it. As Frank Jackson 
has forcefully argued, conceptual analysis has a prescriptive element, and upon 
analysis concepts are often seen to have applications that extend beyond their 
ordinary applications. (See Jackson 1998: 31-32, Jackson 2001: 618. See also 
Gibbard 1990: 32 for a similar point.) But secondly, it is far from clear that our 
definition does entail that well-made VCR players are antiques. It is far from clear 
that VCR players are the right kinds of objects to be antiques.  Here we return to 
the question raised at the end of section II, namely: Which kinds can be antiques? 
There we said that only artefactual kinds can be antiques, but signalled that this 
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was only a rough-and-ready answer, and so implied that we do not think that all 
artefactual kinds are antique-candidate kinds. We also said that we have no more 
precise answer to give about which artefactual kinds are antique-candidate kinds. 
On this score we hope that others will be able to improve upon our account, and it 
may turn out that VCR players are ruled out when such improvements are made. 
Moreover, it may be that our definition already rules out well-made VCRs as being 
antiques (at least at the current time). Although VCRs are themselves now 
obsolete, it is not clear that the styles and methods of production for making them 
are obsolete. We are not experts in this area, but it seems plausible that the style 
in which VCR players were made, and methods of production used in producing 
them, are still used in making their successors, e.g. DVD players and Blu-ray 
players. At any rate, we do not here endorse any particular response to this 
objection, but merely note that there are a number of plausible responses that can 
be given. 
 
IV. Other conditions? 
Are there any other conditions that can make a difference to whether a K is an 
antique K or not? Rosenstein suggests six: 1. Provenance; 2. Condition; 3. 
Completeness; 4. Rarity; 5. Size; and 6. Context. Here we briefly comment on, and 
reject, these conditions: 
 
1. Provenance. An antique’s provenance, strictly speaking, is simply its causal 
history understood in a wide sense to include the time and place it was made, who 
made it, and what has happened to it since it was made (who has owned it, where 
it has been, etc.). An antique’s causal history is itself an important factor in what 
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makes it an antique. But only those aspects of its causal history that relate to its 
style and method of production are important, and this much is already captured 
by the definition we have given. 
 
2. Condition. Rosenstein claims that in certain circumstances an object must be in 
good condition in order to be classed as an antique, but that how good a condition 
it must be in depends on what kind of object it is, how old it is, and what material 
it is made from. (Rosenstein 2009: 165) Stated in ANT-schema form, Rosenstein’s 
suggestion can be spelled out as follows: 
 
 Some object x of an artefactual kind K is an antique K only if x is in good 
condition for a K of its age. 
 
The suggestion is false. Of course, it is often the case that a K in good condition (for 
a K of its age) is more valuable than a K in bad condition (for a K of its age), but 
this has nothing to do with whether any particular K is an antique K or not. Distinct 
antiques can be of different kinds and different kinds have different identity-
conditions. Some have identity-conditions that are quite forgiving. Buildings are 
relatively sturdy – they can withstand fairly heavy alterations without ceasing to 
exist. Other kinds have less forgiving identity-conditions. Cameos are more fragile 
– they are destroyed more easily. And sometimes there are changes that one kind 
of thing can survive but another cannot. Statues can plausibly survive having their 
heads cut off (just about), whilst portrait paintings cannot. These are facts about 
the identity-conditions of kinds of things that can be antiques, but this has nothing 
to do with whether an object is an antique or not. Of course, if an antique object of 
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kind K undergoes changes that destroy it, then, as the antique is the object of kind 
K, the antique itself also ceases to exist. 
 
3. Completeness:  
Rosenstein claims an object can fail to be an antique in some circumstances in 
virtue of being incomplete – that is, in virtue of missing parts. But this claim is only 
true if the object in question also fails to be a K in virtue of having missing parts. 
That is, the following is true: 
 An object x can fail to be an antique K in virtue of having missing parts only if 
x fails to be a K in virtue of having missing parts. 
But this condition is already captured by the definition we have given, and so is 
not an additional condition at all. 
 
4. Rarity. Rosenstein claims that whether an artefact is an antique can depend on 
how many artefacts of its type exist. Again, although whether an artefact is rare 
can affect its value, this has nothing to do with whether it is an antique or not. 
Consider the one-of-a-kind antique 18th Century Qing vase that recently sold at 
Bainbridge’s for £53 million. Suppose it were discovered that this vase was, in fact, 
just one of a job lot, and that a cache of five-hundred (or more) qualitatively 
identical vases were discovered. This would, of course, radically affect the value of 
the vase, but it would not make it a non-antique. The same consideration applies 
to any other example of an antique that is putatively only an antique because it is 
rare. 
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5. Size. Rosenstein argues that objects can fail to be antiques due to their size. He 
claims, for example, that nails are too small to be antiques, and cities too big 
(Rosenstein 2009: 173). We agree that nails and cities cannot be antiques. But this 
has nothing to do with their size. Miniatures and dolls-house furniture are often 
as small as nails, but these can certainly be antiques. And whilst there are obvious 
practical reasons why huge city-sized ceramic pots cannot be built, if one were 
constructed we see no reason why it too should be ruled out from being an antique 
purely in virtue of its size. So why do nails and cities not count as antiques? Once 
more, we here restate that our answer to the question of what kinds of things can 
be antiques was only a rough-and-ready answer, and that we do not think that all 
artefactual kinds are antique-candidate kinds. But just because we do not offer a 
more refined account does not mean that we cannot recognise that certain 
artefactual kinds are not antique-candidate kinds, and here we can recognise that 
nails and cities are not antique-candidate kinds, and so that their not being 
antiques has nothing to do with their size.xiv 
 
6.  Context. The extension of the term ‘antique’ is fully determined, in any context, 
by the definition we have given. That is, an object x falls into its extension at a given 
context iff at that context, x is an artefactual K that exemplifies technical excellence 
and was made in a style and using a method of production that subsequently 
became obsolete, but is exemplary of the era and place in which the K was made. 
The occurrence of ‘was’ means that the term’s extension does depend upon the 
time of the context (that is, when it is used), but there are no further indexical 
terms, so it does not depend upon any further features of the context (e.g. where 
it is used, or who uses it). So the term ‘antique’, used today, anywhere, and by 
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anyone, has the same extension. But, used today the term’s extension contains 
many more things than it would have contained were it used one-hundred years 
ago. Indeed, the term’s extension grows continually as time goes by. It does so 
simply because more and more styles and methods of production become obsolete 
as time goes by, and so there are more and more objects of artefactual kinds that 
were made using past styles and methods of production as time goes by. What our 
account does not allow is for something to be in the extension of the term ‘antique’ 
as used one day, but not as used the next. So our view entails a form of 
contextualism about the term ‘antique’. But this is as it should be. And there is 
certainly no need to include context as a separate condition as Rosenstein 
proposes. Our definition captures everything that should be said about context as 
it stands. 
 
V. Conclusion 
We conclude, then, that what it is to be an antique is captured by the definition we 
have given. There are places where our account could be improved. In particular, 
it could be improved by giving a more precise account of which kinds are antique-
candidate kinds. Our account could also be improved by exploring in more detail 
what it is for a style and method of production to be rooted in its time, and what it 
is for them to become obsolete. Here (as indicated in note xiv), it may be fruitful 
to consider parallels between our account and the various Historical accounts of 
art works that are present in the literature. And there is also the issue of the 
applicability of our account to antique art-objects mentioned briefly above (see 
note xii). Despite these admissions, we believe that our account is substantially 
correct so that any improvement will build upon our account rather than reject 
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any aspect of it. At the very least, the onus is on anyone who disagrees with our 
account to argue for an alternative. 
 Although we have not directly focussed on questions about the aesthetic 
value of antiques, our definition, if correct, is highly suggestive. In the introduction 
we suggested that a large part of an antiques aesthetic value derives from its 
formal properties (that is, on how well they are balanced with those properties 
that allow it to fulfil its intended function), and our definition allows for this. But 
we also said that if antiques have a distinctive aesthetic value then they must 
derive from certain extrinsic non-formal properties.  In particular, we suggested 
that the property of having a certain age is important in this respect. However, in 
light of what we have said, it is plausible that this is not quite right. Our definition 
suggests that it is being rooted in the past that is of fundamental importance in the 
case of antiques, rather than having a certain age itself. We emphasise that we 
have not shown here that this property does serve to ground the distinctive 
aesthetic value of antiques. Perhaps there are good reasons for thinking that it 
cannot do so. But if there are, then either our definition is incorrect, or antiques 
have no distinctive aesthetic value at all. The reason is that if our definition is 
correct, then no other property can be in the running. Although antiques may gain 
additional aesthetic value in virtue of looking old, or being rare, as these properties 
are not constitutive of being an antique (and do not follow even as a matter of fact 
from what it is to be an antique), they cannot ground the value that an antique has 
in virtue of it being an antique. 
 To finish we briefly mention one interesting consequence of our view. Off-
hand one might think that it is analytic that antiques are old. But if our account is 
correct, then strictly speaking, that all antiques are old is a contingent fact, and so 
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not analytic. The contingent fact obtains because in the actual world styles and 
methods of production take a long time to evolve and become obsolete. But if we 
lived in a world in which styles and methods of production radically altered from 
day to day, then things made one day would count as being antiques the next. Such 
a world is hard to imagine and would certainly be very unlike the actual world, but 
that styles and methods of production take a long time to become obsolete can 
scarcely be thought to be a logical or conceptual truth. So it is not analytic that 
antiques are old. Nevertheless, given that styles and methods of production do 
take a long time to become obsolete, all actual antiques are old.xv 
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i Walton’s equally famous argument against formalism about the value of art (Walton 1970) also has an 
analogue. Walton argues that the value that an art-object has depends upon under which category of art 
one views it as falling under (e.g. being a painting or being a collage). It is likewise plausible that a 
particular antique object only has the value that it does if viewed under the category of being an antique. 
Being an antique does not, however, seem to be a sub-category of being an artwork, but seems instead 
to be a disjoint category. 
ii For details on how to distinguish formal from non-formal properties see Zangwill (2001: 56). 
iii Perhaps, however, art-objects too gain an additional value by becoming antique art-objects, and that 
one can gain additional aesthetic appreciation of them by considering them as such. This raises the 
question: what does it take for an art-object to become an antique art-object? Although we will give a 
criterion for what it is for an object to be an antique, in this paper we exclude art-objects, for they seem 
to constitute a special case (see note x for more on this). But even if our criterion does not apply to art-
objects, the question of whether art-objects gain an additional value as they age is an important one that 
considering the case of antiques is likely to shed light upon. This is another reason why those interested 
in aesthetics should be interested in antiques. 
iv For an overview of the literature on this and related topics see Noonan and Curtis (2014). 
v Objects x and y materially coincide at t iff x and y share all parts at t. For more on the puzzles of 
material coincidence see the articles in Rea (1997). 
vi That demonstratives take wide scope is uncontroversial, and follows from Kaplan’s widely held 
account of demonstratives. See, e.g. Kaplan (1989). 
vii In what follows we draw upon the work of Leon Rosenstein. However, there is substantial 
disagreement between our approach and Rosenstein’s. Rosenstein denies that it is possible to give 
necessary and sufficient conditions for being an antique. He picks out nine conditions: 1. Technical 
perfection; 2. Age; 3. Subject; 4. Provenance; 5. Condition; 6. Completeness; 7. Rarity; 8. Size; and 9. 
Context. He argues that despite being ‘more-or-less’ present in individual antiques, all antiques meet at 
least a cluster of them. (Rosenstein 2009: 10) His view thus resembles anti-definitional cluster 
conceptions of art works, such as that defended by Gaut (2000, 2005). Rosenstein suggests that the first 
two conditions are general necessary conditions for being an antique, but denies that the others are. 
However, he also thinks that each condition is such that whether a particular object is an antique or not 
can depend on whether it meets that condition. That is, he thinks that each condition is such that whether 
it is met can, at least in some circumstances, make the difference between a K being an antique K and it 
being a non-antique K. We will argue that the first two conditions alone, once properly understood, 
constitute perfectly general necessary and sufficient conditions for being an antique, and so reject the 
view that the other conditions can make a difference, even in particular cases, to whether a K is an antique 
K. 
viii The hundred year rule appears to have been first introduced in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 
in the United States, introduced to raise tariffs on imported goods. They wished to exclude antiques, and 
introduced the one-hundred year rule stipulatively simply because mass production did not begin in the 
United States until after 1830. 
ix Of course, to say that a style and method of production has become obsolete is not to say that no-one 
now makes objects in that style or using that method of production. It simply means that anyone who 
does so is doing so anachronistically – out of line with the general styles and methods now used. 
x He also considers some art-objects to be antiques, and thinks that they have a representative subject, 
namely, the same representational subject as the art-object itself. In this paper we exclude antique art-
objects from consideration, as they seem to constitute a special case. In particular, the styles and methods 
of production used for creating art-objects are often specific to a particular individual, and even specific 
to a particular individual at a particular time. To give just one example, Kittiwat Unarrom has recently 
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made art-objects out of bread using a technique that no-one before has used. It is thus entirely unclear 
whether it is right to say that the style and method of production he used is rooted in the current era. And 
if it is right, then what would we say about Unarrom’s pieces were he to stop making art-objects using 
these techniques tomorrow? Would the method thereby become obsolete, making his pieces antiques? It 
would be interesting to pursue this and other related matters, but we do not do so here. 
xi There is an important point here regarding the aesthetic value that antiques have. It is plausible that our 
being able to gain special access to facts about the past time at which an antique was made, and about 
how it was constructed, is partly constitutive of appreciating an antique aesthetically, and so what gives 
any antique its distinctive aesthetic value. But if our account is correct, it is in principle possible for there 
to be antiques such that we cannot gain such access. So, does this show that antiques cannot be said to 
possess a distinctive aesthetic value in virtue of our being able to gain access to such facts? It does not, 
for in practice it is always possible to gain access to such facts (especially if we utilise modern 
investigative techniques such as stereo microscopy, UV radiation, X-radiography, and plasma-
spectrometry - see Caple 2006). So, as a matter of fact, antiques are invariably such that we are able to 
gain special access to facts about the past time at which they were made, and about how they were 
constructed. Thus, even though this is not strictly speaking part of what it is to be an antique, as a matter 
of fact it follows invariably from being an antique that we can gain access to about the past time at which 
they were made, and about how they were constructed, and so such facts can still ground the distinctive 
aesthetic experience that antiques give rise to. 
xii We note in passing that our definition thus bears a resemblance to Historical definitions of what it is 
to be a work of art, such as the definitions defended by Levinson (1990), Carroll (1993), and Stecker 
(2005). Whether there is anything to be learnt from this resemblance, and whether making connections 
between works of art and antiques helps in cashing out precisely what it is for antiques to be rooted in 
the past, is a good question, but we do not consider it further here. 
xiii We thank the editors of this journal for raising this interesting objection. 
xiv It is plausible that cities are not antiques because they do not meet the conditions for being an antique 
we have already laid down. Cities are constituted by a great number of buildings constructed at different 
times in their histories, and so in different styles, using different methods of production, rooted in 
different times. Therefore, considered as a whole, they are not rooted in any particular past time and fail 
to be antiques for this reason. 
xv We would like to thank Jon Robson, Stefano Predelli, Harold Noonan, two anonymous referees, and 
the editors of this journal for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
